Analytic philosophy is rediscovering Hegel. This essay examines a particularly strong thread of new analytic Hegelianism, sometimes called 'Pittsburgh Hegelianism', which began with the work of Wilfrid Sellars. In trying to bring Anglo-American philosophy from its empiricist phase into a more sophisticated, corrected Kantianism, Sellars moved in substantially Hegelian directions. Sellars' work has been extended, and revised by his Pittsburgh colleagues John
The Pittsburgh school originated in the work of Wilfrid S. Sellars (1912 Sellars ( -1989 . Sellars 
II. Sociality and Historicity
Some of Sellars's references to Hegel are either indirect or subtly critical when read closely, but It was not until the time of Hegel that the essential role of the group as a mediating factor in this causation [of the presence in the individual of the framework of conceptual thinking] was recognized, and while it is easy for us to see that the immanence and transcendence of conceptual frameworks with respect to the individual thinker is a social phenomenon, and to find a recognition of this fact implicit in the very form of our image of man in the world, it was not until the nineteenth century that this feature of the manifest image was, however inadequately, taken into account. 3 The social nature of thought and conceptuality remains an invariant commitment of the Pittsburgh school, reinforced by the influence of Wittgenstein's later works.
Sellars quickly hedges his endorsement of this Hegelian insight with criticism:
The manifest image must, therefore, be construed as containing a conception of itself as a group phenomenon, the group mediating between the individual and the intelligible order. But any attempt to explain this mediation within the framework of the manifest image was bound to fail, for the manifest image contains the resources for such an attempt only in the sense that it provides the foundation on which scientific theory can build an explanatory framework; and while conceptual structures of this framework are built on the manifest image, they are not definable within it. Thus, the Hegelian, like the Platonist of whom he is the heir, was limited to the attempt to understand the relation between intelligible order and individual minds in analogical terms. 4 There are several different issues at play here, and we need to keep them separate. One issue concerns the general status of the conceptual or intelligible order, while another concerns the deVries for OUP Handbook of Hegel Page 6 particular status of our currently dominant conceptual framework and its major features. The relations between these two are complex for both Hegel and Sellars. Both philosophers are, in one sense of the term, epistemic realists about the conceptual order. That is, they both think that (descriptive) concepts aim at delimiting the very nature of things; they see no sense in the Kantian notion of a thing-in-itself that is in principle beyond the reach of the conceptual or the knowable. But at the same time, they are hardly naïve realists: though concepts aim at delimiting the nature of things, they also tend to fall short of their target. Indeed, both of them acknowledge that it takes significant effort to develop successively better and better concepts.
For both Hegel and Sellars, the sociality of thought entails also its historicity. We always operate with a less than ultimately satisfactory conceptual framework that is fated to be replaced by something more satisfactory, whether on the basis of conceptual or empirical considerations.
Hegel sketches a complex sequence of ever more sophisticated conceptual schemes in the Phenomenology. Sellars boils this down to a clash between what he calls the 'manifest image'
[MI]-the rich commonsense scheme in terms of which we ordinarily make sense of the world-and the 'scientific image'[SI]-the incipient and (potentially) radically different scheme that is starting to be constructed by the empirical sciences. 5 For both Hegel and Sellars, grasp of the Truth lies at the end of a long process.
Although Hegel and Sellars think along related lines with regard to the status of conceptual frameworks vis-a-vis reality, they differ significantly concerning the content of the ultimate framework. For any complex conceptual framework, there will be some architecture of explanatory priorities that makes some concepts more fundamental than others that are to be explained in terms of more basic concepts. For Hegel, the most general and explanatorily most basic concepts are those of spirit: reason, concept, subjectivity and objectivity, etc. Ultimately, deVries for OUP Handbook of Hegel Page 7
we understand nature in terms of its relation to spirit, and the process by which we come to be able to grasp the truth is a process by which spirit comes to know itself. Things are quite otherwise with Sellars, who thinks the explanatorily prior concepts in the scientific image will be the concepts of materiality.
78. This is a complex claim, but it comes down to the idea that even though mentalistic (or spiritual) discourse is both indispensible for creatures like us and irreducible to material-object discourse, in the scientific image the mental will be seen to depend on the material ontologically. 8 One's ontology is determined by the explanatorily most basic kinds recognized in one's conceptual framework. Hegel is undoubtedly an idealist; we can let others worry about how weighty a metaphysical idealism it is. Sellars is a decided materialist: 'the solution of the puzzle lay in correctly locating the conceptual order in the causal order and correctly interpreting the causality involved'. 9 According to Sellars, the manifest image generates questions it cannot answer on its own. Even augmented with the Hegelian insight that the community is an essential intermediary between the individual and the intelligible order, Sellars claims that the manifest framework is not in a position to explain how the community serves this role. This is a complex thought. First, what
Sellars calls the 'intelligible order' is the network of rational connections among the concepts of a conceptual framework. 10 For example, our confidence that brothers are male siblings and that deVries for OUP Handbook of Hegel Page 8
water turns to ice when cooled sufficiently are both expressions of connections that have come to be built in to the intelligible order made available to us by our conceptual framework/language.
As noted above, until the 19 th century, philosophers believed that these rational connections are learned by means of some action of the world (broadly construed) upon our individual minds.
Furthermore, according to Sellars, '[i]n the Platonic tradition this mode of causation is attributed to a being which is analogous, to a greater or lesser degree, to a person'. 11 In Sellars' view, Hegel, as a member in good standing of the Platonic tradition, also sought to understand the relation between intelligible order and individual mind in terms of something person-like that accounts for how individuals come to possess a (normatively constituted) conceptual framework in terms of which the world in which they live can be understood. This is spirit informing the activity and pervading the being of the human individual. Spirit is not like an individual person, localized in space and time, nor is it outside of space and time, but its fundamental structure is still that of a synthetic, rational unity, a mind. It makes sense to attribute 'cunning' to spirit, for instance.
Sellars's view is that the manifest image cannot explain how it is that the community (or spirit)
mediates the individual's acquisition of a conceptual framework. Sellars gives us no argument in PSIM for this negative claim. He needs a positive argument to establish that the manifest image cannot develop such an explanation and that we must turn to a radically novel scientific framework to do so. The manifest image has shown itself in the past to be a flexible tool for coping with reality, capable of growth and development in order to accommodate an ever richer understanding of the structure of reality and our relation to it. Sellars himself was a right-wing Sellarsian, and he thinks we are now able 'to see this [problem of the acquisition of a conceptual scheme] as a matter of evolutionary development as a group phenomenon'. 14 The point is that evolution can generate categorially new objects, even something like a conceptual scheme. 15 Ruth Millikan, for instance, has shown how such processes can be accommodated within a generally Sellarsian view. 16 Yet one of the great lacks in Sellars's philosophy is a treatment of the biological and social sciences. This is not sheer accident, for accommodating teleologically constituted biological or normatively constituted social phenomena within the causal structures central to science's concerns is a daunting challenge.
How are we to construe the relations among irreducibly distinct groups of concepts, all of which seem to be necessary for a full comprehension of our multifarious world? Arguably, both Sellars and Hegel believe that there is some privileged set of concepts, some privileged layer of discourse, that provides the most universal and encompassing viewpoint on the world, its history, and our place in it. This then determines our ultimate ontology: materialistic for Sellars, idealistic for Hegel. Neither seems to take seriously that the irreducibility of these different sets of concepts is itself indicative of the ultimate furniture of the world.
III. The Myth of the Atomic
Sellars is most commonly identified with the critique of the myth of the given first articulated in his classic essay "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind". This critique can be construed along fairly narrow epistemological lines, but it really reaches across the full range of the cognitive as a critique of any atomistic, foundationalistic construal of the structure of meaningful human activity, both theoretical and practical. That is, Sellars denies that the epistemic, semantic, or intentional properties of any episodes or states accrue to them either in isolation or as simply descriptive properties.
The essential point is that in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we
are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says.
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'Empirical' is used here as G. E. Moore used 'natural', to stand for the purely matter-of-factual in contrast to anything normative or evaluative. The 'logical space of reasons' is, first, an abstract space, that is, an array of potential positions, the identity of which is determined (holistically) by their relations to the other potential positions, and, second, an essentially normative realm, structured by the oughts and ought-nots of good inference (both formal and material). 18 Epistemic givens would be states that possess their epistemic status independently of their (epistemic) relations to any other states, e.g., a self-justifying belief or a belief that is warranted simply because it is caused in a certain way. Semantic givens would be states that possess a certain meaning independently of their (semantic) relations to any other states, e.g., because they are intrinsically intelligible or derive meaning from some (non-normative)
'ostensive tie' to some object.
Thus, Sellars denies both that there are 'atoms' of knowledge or meaning independent of their relation to other 'pieces' of knowledge or meaning, and that they are structured in a neat hierarchy rather than an interlocking (social) network. The determinate content of a thought or utterance is fixed by its position in the space of implications and employments available to the community in its language or conceptual framework. This kind of holism is congenial to
Hegelian modes of thinking. It is important to see, however, that Sellars also rejects standard forms of coherentism.
Above all, the [standard] picture is misleading because of its static character. One seems forced to choose between the picture of an elephant which rests on a tortoise (What supports the tortoise?) and the picture of a great Hegelian serpent of knowledge with its tail in its mouth (Where does it begin?). Neither will do. For empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated extension, science, is rational, not because it has a foundation but because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not all at once. 19 This seems like a rejection of Hegel, but it is, of course, a rejection of the cartoon version of
Hegel that was all too dominant in Anglo-American philosophy. Recognition of the dynamics, of the dialectics of thought is precisely what is needed to fix the imagery.
IV. The Return to Experience
Sellars' attempt to escape the apparently forced choice between foundationalism and coherentism was picked up to great notice in John McDowell's 1994 book Mind and World, wherein he wants to help us escape the 'intolerable oscillation' that has characterized modern philosophy between coherentism, a theory that gives us only a 'frictionless spinning in the void' which 'cannot make sense of the bearing of thought on objective reality,' and foundationalism, 'an appea1to the given, which turns out to be useless'. 20 For both Sellars and McDowell, resolving this tension means developing a more adequate conception of experience itself, one that embodies the Kantian insight that experience is both sensory and conceptual, aetiologically non-inferential yet justificationally embedded in an inferentially structured matrix. [B]y denying that sense impressions, however indispensable to cognition, were themselves cognitive, Kant made a radical break with all his predecessors, empiricists and rationalists alike. The 'of-ness' of sensation simply isn't the 'of-ness' of even the most rudimentary thought. . . . But his own question haunted me. How is it possible that knowledge has this structure? . . . It wasn't until much later that I came to see that the solution of the puzzle lay in correctly locating the conceptual order in the causal order and correctly interpreting the causality involved. 21 For Sellars, then, experience is a double-sided coin. The sensory aspect of experience is part of the causal story of the impact of the world upon us, but its conceptual aspect locates it within the logical space of reasons, the space of reasons for belief and for action. 22 Early on, McDowell rejected the idea that 'receptivity makes an even notionally separable contribution to its cooperation with spontaneity', 23 though in later works he backs away from this fairly extreme position.
IVA. Realism, the Phenomenal, and Transcendental Idealism
The thus and so. That things are thus and so is the content of the experience, and it can also be the content of a judgement: it becomes the content of a judgement if the subject decides to take the experience at face value. So it is conceptual content. But that things are thus and so is also, if one is not misled, an aspect of the layout of the world: it is how things are. Thus the idea of conceptually structured operations of receptivity puts us in a position to speak of experience as openness to the layout of reality. Hegel provides for numerous phenomenal realities related in ways that require a phenomenology to understand. It is not the distinction between phenomenon and reality itself that Hegel and Sellars attack, but the notion that it is absolute, establishing an unbridgeable divide. 25 McDowell, however, is concerned to defend our 'openness to the layout of reality' and seems not to take seriously the idea that we might have systematically false beliefs about the nature of things. 26 On this score, Sellars is more Hegelian than McDowell.
IVB. Space, Time, and a Full-Fledged Epistemological Realism
Kant's arguments for transcendental idealism turn crucially on the status of space and time. Sellars' response to Kant is strikingly similar, for Sellars also recognizes that there is no Archimedean point outside of common reality from which the critic can operate. He also rejects absolute, hard and fast dualisms in favor of limited and pragmatically justified distinctions. As Paul Redding argues, Hegel and Sellars reject both an exogenous and an endogenous given. 28 That is, neither empirical content nor conceptual scheme are given to us independently of the other. But if conceptual form is not given independently of the real world, there is little reason to think that it is related only contingently to that world and affords us a mode of access to it unrelated to what that world is in itself. In Sellars' view, as well as Hegel's, human life is a dynamic, fallible enterprise that begins from relative ignorance (even of ourselves), is fraught with contradictions to be overcome, and works itself slowly via constant revision towards an ever more adequate grasp of and fittedness to the reality within which (as opposed to over against which) we live.
McDowell expresses his concern with Kant's transcendental idealism as a worry that it reduces experience and knowledge to 'facts about us'. He agrees that neither empirical content nor conceptual scheme are given to us independently of the other. But rather than trying to accord sensation as something non-conceptual a distinguishable place in experience, like Sellars and
Hegel, McDowell denies that there is anything non-conceptual in experience. Space and time
should not be seen as forms of a distinct, non-conceptual element in experience, but, as
McDowell claims Hegel also thought, as further categorial forms of the conceptual content in experience. The sensory is, thus, not an intermediary between understanding and the world, but a way in which we are open to the world, a shaping of our consciousness of the world.
When Kant makes it look as if the forms of our sensibility are brute-fact features of our subjectivity, it becomes difficult to see how they could also be forms of the manifestness
to us of what is genuinely objective. But when, in the move Hegel applauds, Kant puts the forms of our sensibility on a level with the categories, he takes a step towards making it possible to see the forms of our sensibility, no less than the categories, as genuinely forms of cognition --at once forms of subjective activity and forms of genuine objectivity with which that activity engages. 29 Assimilating space and time to the other categories of conceptuality and essentially ignoring them as forms intrinsic to the self-external is not at all clearly Hegelian. 30 Furthermore,
McDowell's deconstruction of the intuition/concept distinction undercuts the Kantianism that he claims to be defending. What, after all, is left once Kant's his claim that there are two independent sources of knowledge that combine in experience is rejected? 31 In this light, McDowell's move seems less a radicalization of Kant than a retreat to Leibniz.
IVC. A Form of Idealism

Still, there is a clear sense in which McDowell espouses idealism. For McDowell endorses
Wittgenstein's dictum that 'The world is everything that is the case'. 32 And if we do say that and mean it, we conceive the world, not … as a totality of the describable things --zebras and so forth --that there are (as we say) in it, but as precisely, everything that can be truly thought or said: not everything we would think about if we thought truly, but everything we would think. 33 McDowell goes on to say, 'This is an idealism in an obvious sense. On this conception, the world itself is indeed structured by the form of judgment'. 34 These claims reveal McDowell's idealism as a form of logical realism. The fundamental structure of McDowell's world is logical or conceptual structure, and the primary force of that claim is that it (1) denies that either spatio-temporal or causal structure is fundamental except insofar as space, time, and causation are themselves logical categories and (2) Coherence can be invoked in a theory of truth, a theory of meaning (or of concepts), and a theory of justification or knowledge. 35 Sellars exploits all three forms. As mentioned, The cube is red It is raining So, the cube is colored So, it will be wet outside are not formally valid, but they are good material inferences. Sellars denies that we ought to think of them as essentially enthymematic: not all inference licenses can be made into explicit premises. 37 For Sellars, such facts about inferential proprieties determine both the form and the content of our judgings and the concepts used in them.
. . . . To say of a judging that it has a certain logical form is to classify it and its
constituents with respect to their epistemic powers.
24. If judgings qua conceptual acts have "form," they also have "content." . . . . The temptation is to think of the "content" of an act as an entity that is "contained" by it. But if the "form" of a judging is the structure by virtue of which it is possessed of certain generic logical or epistemic powers, surely the content must be the character by virtue of which the act has specific modes of these generic logical or epistemic powers. 38 One consequence of this view is that linguistic/semantic form and content are not radically different. If, e.g., physical object judgments have their own 'form' (perhaps, e.g., suppressible default inferences concerning spatio-temporal location, causal connectivity, or appropriate forms of evidence), then judgments about rocks fill in or specify this form in determinate ways.
In Sellars' view all semantic predicates are ultimately metalinguistic functional classifiers. It is not just meaning statements that classify expressions functionally; so do reference statements and even truth attributions. Sellars thus denies that meaning, reference, or truth denote relations between words or thoughts and objects in the world. 39 This is sometimes described as a rejection of representationalism, though Sellars talks regularly about representations, both linguistic and mental. He certainly rejects the idea that there is some set of specific, fundamental semantic 'relations' between language or concept and the world (say, the meaning, reference, or satisfaction relations) that determines our ontology. He has also written more on Hegel than his colleagues, and has been working for years on a commentary on the Phenomenology of Spirit, successive drafts of which are available on his website. Here I draw mainly on his Woodbridge Lectures, a broad overview of his interpretation of German idealism and Hegel's particular position in that movement. 40 These lectures are more relevant to our purposes here than the details of the Phenomenology.
Brandom sees Hegel as modifying several central themes in Kant's transcendental idealism. The first of these Kantian themes is the realization that intentionality, the fundamental defining trait of the mental, is, at root, a normative affair.
What distinguishes judging and intentional doing from the activities of non-sapient creatures is not that they involve some special sort of mental processes, but that they are things knowers and agents are in a distinctive way responsible for. Judging and acting involve commitments. They are endorsements, exercises of authority. 41 This is Sellars' idea that intentional state attributions locate the subject in 'the logical space of reasons'. Sapience (conceptual thought) involves responsibility, and the fundamental responsibility, according to Brandom, is to integrate one's intentional states (both one's past states and one's growing accumulation of new intentional states) into a total unity of apperception. This involves elaborating and adopting the material and formal consequences of one's intentional states and eliminating conflicts that may arise among them. One is, thus, responsible for one's thoughts and actions, the contents of which are determined by their relations (again, both formal and material) to other intentional states (echoing Sellars' coherence theory of meaning and intentionality); and one is responsible to the objects of one's judgments insofar as they (the objects) set the standard of correctness for the commitments one undertakes in judging. It is the synthetic activity of "integrating judgments with one another, by critical exclusion and ampliative inclusion or extension [that] makes the concepts both of subject and of object intelligible". 42 The second Kantian theme in Hegel concerns the nature of normativity itself. Kant's Enlightenment twist is the attitude-dependence of norms, which come to exist only when humans start taking and treating each other as authoritative, responsible, committed, etc. Kant's understanding of the attitude-dependence of normativity puts the notion of autonomy, selfgovernance, center stage: 'we, as subjects, are genuinely normatively constrained only by rules we constrain ourselves by, those that we adopt and acknowledge as binding on us'. 43 If normativity is grounded in the autonomy of individuals, however, there is a potential problem.
If it were up to us both whether we are bound by or responsible to a particular conceptual norm, which is a matter of the normative force of our judgmental act, and what it is we are bound to, the content of the judgmental act, then whatever seems right to one would be right. In that case, normativity collapses, because there is no sense to getting things right or wrong. The norms of force and content must be relatively independent of each other.
Hegel's principal innovation is his idea that in order to follow through on Kant's fundamental insight into the essentially normative character of mind, meaning, and rationality, we need to recognize that normative statuses such as authority and responsibility are at base social statuses. 44 It is not just within an individual that the synthetic activity of rational integration occurs. Such activity is meaningful only when individuals rationally integrate themselves into a community.
We could put it this way: The older obedience model of authority takes the status of the commander to be the relevant independent variable in the normative; Kant's autonomy model takes the status of commandee to be the relevant independent variable; Hegel insists that both are What institutes normative statuses is reciprocal recognition. Someone becomes responsible only when others hold him responsible, and exercises authority only when others acknowledge that authority. One has the authority to petition others for recognition, in an attempt to become responsible or authoritative. To do that, one must recognize others as able to hold one responsible or acknowledge one's authority. This is according those others a certain kind of authority. To achieve such statuses, one must be recognized by them in turn. That is to make oneself in a certain sense responsible to them. But they have that authority only insofar as one grants it to them by recognizing them as authoritative. How do these two stories, the synthesis of the self and the social model of normativity, fit together into an overall Hegelian view? According to Brandom, they must both be placed in a larger historical developmental structure. Brandom employs the common law tradition of jurisprudence as a partial model of the kind of historical developmental structure he has in mind here. In common law, judges have a fair amount of discretion in deciding whether and how a law applies to a given situation, but they are under an obligation to say how their application of the law is consistent with, extends, or even corrects the precedents in hand. And no one decision settles such matters; each is a petition to future judges to see their cases in the same light.
Ongoing social practices of integrating old and new commitments institute the normative statuses of authority and responsibility. That is, they are sufficient to create and sustain the normative statuses that constitute the logical space of reasons.
It is this historical process that determines (by progressive refinement) the contents of our concepts. In order to understand how that could be, however, Brandom argues that we need a different notion of determinateness from the one generally assumed by mainstream analytic philosophy. Brandom describes what he calls 'Fregean determinateness' as involving 'sharp, complete boundaries'. 46 For each such concept, it is a settled matter, semantically speaking, whether it applies to any object, definitively and in advance of any actual application. Hegel disparages such a vision of the conceptual realm as the attitude of 'Verstand', understanding.
In its place Hegel proposes a vision of the conceptual realm he calls 'Vernunft', reason. The rational knower realizes that her concepts (her commitments and entitlements) are rarely finally fixed, they are almost always open-ended, susceptible to refinement, correction, even relocation in the overall scheme, and these adjustments are moments in an on-going story of the justification and integration of our commitments. (Recall here the de-absolutization of the apriori/aposteriori distinction mentioned earlier.) The rational unity we strive for among our representations is not a merely synchronic unity, but also a diachronic narrative of growth and elaboration. This view of conceptual determinateness is temporally perspectival: concepts exist in time with both forward-and backward-looking components. 47 Such a sequence reconstructs the history of one's current view as gradually making explicit what was previously only implicit; it reveals one's present view as the result of progress in the epistemic and/or practical realms from an earlier, less refined position.
In taking one's current commitments as the standard to judge what counts as expressive progress, one is taking them as the reality of which previous constellations of endorsements were ever more complete and accurate appearances. 48 Hegel is working out the idea that conceptual content is articulated by non-monotonic, seriously multipremise material inferential and incompatibility relations, in the context of the realization (which we latecomers to the point associate with Quine, and he associated with Duhem) that those relations depend on the whole context of collateral discursive commitments. 49 The conceptual contents of thoughts are articulated by the material consequential and incompatibility relations that hold among them. Brandom then makes his own move towards a conceptual realism,
The principled parallel between the deontic modal relations of inclusion and exclusion that articulate our thought on the subjective side, and the alethic modal relations of inclusion and exclusion that articulate the world on the objective side . . . define a structural conception of the conceptual according to which thought and the world thought about can both be seen to be conceptually structured. This conceptual realism about objective reality is, in the context of the other metatheoretic commitments we have been considering, just a consequence of modal realism: taking it that objective states of affairs really do necessitate and rule out one another. 50 Thus, while Sellars would shudder at the thought that the (quasi-)logical relations that connect the contents of our thoughts are 'of the same generic kind' as the causal and compositional relations among the objects, events, and facts of nature, Brandom makes common cause with
McDowell's logico-conceptual realism. This is the truth in Hegel's absolute idealism. As
Brandom argues, the claim is not that natural objects are mind-dependent, particularly not on the deVries for OUP Handbook of Hegel Page 27
peculiarities of human subjectivity nor in any causal sense of 'dependent'. Rather, the activities pragmatically constitutive of the objectivity of thinking about a modally structured world are connected intrinsically with the activities pragmatically constitutive of normatively wellstructured thought. Being an object and being a fact are themselves also normative statuses.
Brandom's Hegel ends up, then, preparing the way for Brandom himself. While Brandom shows us a way to read Hegel that puts logic and semantics properly at the heart of his concerns and ties those to modern approaches to such issues, it is far from clear how smoothly Brandom's view map onto Hegel's. Brandom's own cavalier attitude towards the notion of 'experience' seems quite foreign to Hegel. Brandom has not delved far into social or political philosophy, though its foundations play a large role in his philosophy. He has mostly borrowed his social/political philosophy eclectically from the German idealists. He faces, at bottom, the task of reconciling 3 doctrines:
1. Concepts are constituted by norms.
2. Norms are attitude-dependent.
3. Conceptual realism: the world (and not just our thinking about it) is conceptually structured.
Brandom's non-metaphysical reading of Hegel convinces him he can claim to be Hegelian without incurring the metaphysical commitments traditionally attributed to Hegel. Thus, Brandom's reconstruction of the Hegelian system does not seem to constitute an ontological proof of God's existence, but we can pose the question to Brandom: does his conceptual realism ultimately commit him as well to the Idea?
VI. Conclusion: Reality and Concept in Dynamic Interaction
Their conceptual realism is the most significant tie to Hegelian doctrine shared by McDowell In contrast to McDowell, Brandom retains and elaborates Sellars' functionalist semantics, fitting much more smoothly with both the phenomena of conceptual change and the commitment to the normativity of intentionality. Sellars attempts to fit the structural insights of German idealism into a naturalistic framework that assigns to natural science authority over the ontology of the empirical world. This, however, in Sellars' view, requires denying that normative features of the world are part of its empirical furniture; they are solely features of our social relationships and practices. Both McDowell and Brandom seek to give the normative realm a deeper tie to empirical reality, either by virtue of a relation that unites the intentional and the material realms or a structural parallelism that plays that role.
This review has skimmed a number of surfaces; it has not plumbed the depths or the details of these sophisticated thinkers to any great degree. Yet the Pittsburgh school acknowledges and 
